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THE TREATY OF MOULTRIE CREEK, 1823
by JOHN  K. MAHON
A DECADE BEFORE THE  United States obtained possession ofthe whole of Florida the Indians had learned to fear Ameri-
cans. Three times the men of the new nation to the north had in-
vaded the peninsula; two of these invasions had brought ruin to
the redmen. The first invasion-during the “Patriot War” of
1811-1813 - had initiated the disintegration of the towns and the
agriculture of the Indians, east of the Suwannee River. The
second - Andrew Jackson’s campaign in 1818 - had wreaked
the same havoc upon those west of the Suwannee. The Florida
Indians were never the same after these two catastrophes;
perceptive white men testified to this fact. In 1822, Captain
John R. Bell, U.S. Army, acting agent to the Seminoles said they
had once been proud, numerous, and wealthy, possessing great
numbers of cattle, horses, and slaves; “they are now weak and
poor, yet their native spirit is not so much broken as to humble
them to the dust.” The following year Joseph M. Hernandez, a
pre-United States Floridian and a person of consequence in the
peninsula put it this way. “. . . being thus broken up [they]
have continued ever Since, without the least Kind of Spirit of
industry or enterprize, - they could at one time have been con-
sidered as having arrived at the first Stage Civilization.” But it
remained for one of their own to set their downfall in deeply
touching words. Chief Sitarky said, “When I walk about these
woods, now so desolate, and remember the numerous herds that
once ranged through them, and the former prosperity of our
nation, the tears come into my eyes.” 1
Quite naturally the Seminoles were alarmed when rumor
reached them that Spain had transferred their abode to the
1. J. R. Bell to Secy. of War, Jan. 22, 1822, American State Papers:
Ind ian  A f f a i r s ,  I I ,  416 ;  J .  M.  Hernandez  to  Secy .  o f  War ,  Mar .
11, 1823, in Clarence E. Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers of the
United States: Florida Territory, XXII, 644; Sitarky quoted in Wil-
liam H. Simmons, Notices of East Florida: With an Account of the
S e m i n o l e  N a t i o n  o f  I n d i a n s  (Char les ton ,  1822) ,  89 ;  Joseph  M.
White to Secy. of War, December 1, 1822, ASP: Indian Affairs, II,
411.  For  de ta i l  on  the  “Pat r io t  War” see  Rember t  W.  Pat r ick ,
Florida Fiasco (Athens, Ga., 1954).
[ 350 ]
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United States. Rumor is all that percolated through to them, and
there was plenty of time for it to eat at their nerves, since two
years passed before the treaty of transfer was ratified by both
sides. Meanwhile, white speculators whispered that Andrew
Jackson was coming with a large army to wipe them out once and
for all. Some Indians sold their slaves and cattle at disaster prices
and plunged into the interior. The United States, for its part,
did nothing to relieve the anxiety of the savages. 2 Few of its
leaders, indeed, seemed to feel that Article Six of the treaty of
transfer applied to the Seminoles:
The inhabitants of the territories which his Catholic Majesty
cedes to the United States, by this treaty, shall be incorporated
in the Union of the United States,  as soon as may be
consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and
admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and
immunities, of the citizens of the United States. 3
But that the new owner of the peninsula was acutely aware
of the redmen living there is certain, for the government appoint-
ed a subagent to deal with them before the real estate had of-
ficially changed hands. The date of his commission was March
31, 1821; the person, a Frenchman named Jean A. Penieres. No
one on the ground could see sufficient reason for his choice inas-
much as he could speak neither Muskogee, Hitchiti, nor English.
Certainly the choice did not spring from known sympathy for
his charges. He reported that the Seminoles seemed dirtier and
lazier than other Indians he had seen. 4
On March 2, 1821, Congress sharply reduced the army. A
few words will show the connection between this event and the
narrative we are following. One result of the cut was that there
was to be but one major general instead of two. This raised the
delicate political problem of what to do with the “riffed” one,
he being none other than Andrew Jackson, a folk hero. Inas-
much as Jackson more than any man had panted after Florida and
2. Charles Vignoles, Observations Upon the Floridas (New York, 1823),
134, 135.    
3. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States
and  His  Ca tho l i c  Majes ty ,  February  22 ,  1819 ,  in  ASP:  Foreign
Relations, IV, 623-625.
4. Secy. of War to J.  A. Penieres, Mar. 31, 1821, Territorial Papers:
Florida, XXII;, 27; J. R. Bell to Secy. of War, Aug. 14, 1821, ibid.,
170; J. A. Penieres to Andrew Jackson, July 19, 1821, ASP: Indian
Affairs,  II,  412.
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been responsible for connecting it at last with the United States,
a solution was ready at hand. The President’s commission was
issued to him on March 10, 1821, to be governor of the new
territory. Nor was he the only person to pass off of the payroll
of the army and onto that of the territorial government. Several
displaced officers took the same path. 5
The appointment of their old conqueror was bad news to the
Seminoles. Could they have seen his correspondence, it would
have seemed worse. Jackson told John Quincy Adams, Secretary
of State, that in 1818 he had ordered many of the “Redstick”
Creeks to go back north whither they had come. Nearly a thousand
warriors had migrated to Florida after General Jackson had
beaten them in the Creek War, 1813-1814. These migrants were
part of the faction of the Creek Nation which had warred upon
the United States, a faction referred to as “Redsticks.”
“These Indians,” Jackson wrote later, “can have no claim to
lands in the Floridas, humanity and justice is sufficiently ex-
tended to them by . . . permission to return, and live in peace
with their own nation.” He either did not realize the deep hatred
existing between the Florida migrants and the Creeks who had
not moved (a hatred which resulted from having fought against
each other in the Creek War) or else he did not care. 6
Until Andrew Jackson should reach his new post he des-
ignated Captain Bell to act for him. By law the governor of the
territory was also superintendent of Indian affairs. But the
government failed to explain to Bell the role of Penieres. As a
result, the acting superintendent wrote, “I am informed that a
french gentleman has been on the St. Johns river styling himself
an authorized agent of the United States to explore the country
and to hold talks with the Indians, him I shall take measures thro
the Alcalde to have brought before me.” Eighteen days later
the Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, posted a letter advising
him that Penieres was a legitimate representative. 7
5. An Act to Reduce and Fix the Military Peace Establishment . .
March 2, 1821, U. S. Statutes at Large, III, 615; Territorial Papers:
Florida, XXII, 21n.
6. Andrew Jackson to Secy. of State, April 2, 1821, Territorial Papers:
Florida, XXII, 29; Jackson to Secy. of War, Sept. 20, 1821, ibid.,
211.
7 .  J .  R .  Be l l  t o  Secy .  o f  War ,  Ju ly  17 ,  1821 ,  Terr i t o r ia l  Paper s :
Florida, XXII, 126; Secy. of War to J. R. Bell, Aug. 4, 1821, ibid.,
164.
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Meanwhile, the suspense was unbearable for the Seminoles.
They had to try to learn what lay in store for them under the
United States. Several times some chiefs went to St. Augustine
to make inquiry, but could learn little. Next, Micanopy, head chief
of a number of bands, arranged with two trusted white men,
Horatio S. Dexter and Edmund M. Wanton, to negotiate a treaty
for his people. This was close to July 17, 1821, the date when
Governor Jackson arrived and took formal possession of Pensa-
cola. One of his first acts was to issue orders to seize these “self
made” Indian agents, for no white man had a right to negotiate
with the savages except as an authorized agent of the government.
No harm came to Dexter and Wanton, neither did any treaty
result, for not only did the Governor refuse to deal with such
agents, but he also stated his desire nevermore to be involved
in a treaty with Indians. Inasmuch as Congress had both the
authority and the power to handle Indian affairs, he said, there
was no sense in treating the tribes as nations. 8
On September 28, 1821, Secretary Calhoun appointed Cap-
tain Bell acting agent to the Seminoles. Now the organization
for handling the Indians was complete: Jackson was superin-
tendent, Bell acting agent, and Penieres subagent. It mattered
not that neither superintendent nor acting agent had met the
subagent, with a full table of organization on the white side it
appeared likely that the redmen would soon know where they
stood. Fate did not so dispose! On October 6 Andrew Jackson
went off to the Hermitage, never to return to Florida. At about
the same moment Penieres died of yellow fever. Only a few
weeks later Captain Bell was charged with conduct unbecoming
an officer and suspended from his duties. Thus the organization
was shattered, the Indians left wondering. 9
But the government in Washington and the white leaders in
the peninsula continued to ponder on the problem of the Semi-
noles. They considered two alternatives: to concentrate the
Indians somewhere in Florida or to remove them altogether.
8. A. Jackson to Secy. of War, Sept.  17, 1821, ibid. ,  207; Dexter and
Wanton to A. Eustis, Oct. 5, 1821, ibid., 244. For data on Horatio
Dexter see Mark F. Boyd, “Horatio S. Dexter and Events Leading
t o  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  M o u l t r i e  G r e e k  w i t h  t h e  S e m i n o l e  I n d i a n s , ”
Florida Anthropologist, XI (Sept., 1958), 65-95.
9. Secy. of War to J. R. Bell, Sept. 28, 1821, Territorial Papers:
Florida, XXII, 220. For Bell’s court martial and subsequent acquittal
see ibid. ,  409n.
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Calhoun defined these two courses as early as March, 1821.
Which alternative had Governor Jackson preferred? His first
choice was to remove them out of the peninsula, but he saw,
once on the ground, that this was unobtainable at the moment.
Then they must be concentrated, and the proper place was along
the Apalachicola River close to the Georgia and Alabama
boundaries. There they could not cut communication between
St. Augustine and Pensacola; there a white settlement would
stand between them and the sea. They must not have access to
open ocean because across it they could receive foreign influence
and foreign arms and ammunition. Indeed, they had carried on a
traffic with Cuba for many decades. But situated along the upper
Apalachicola they would be hemmed in on all sides. 10
Most white men preferred the alternative of eliminating
them from the peninsula, and the simplest way to do this, at least
on the surface, was to send them off to rejoin the Creeks in
Georgia and Alabama. This solution did not reckon with the
Seminoles. Acting Governor William Worthington gave his
estimate of their attitude toward it: “It is said they never will
consent to go up among the Creeks - They will assume no
hostile attitude, against the United States, no matter what Course
they may adopt respecting them - But if they are ordered up
amongst the Creeks, they will take to the bushes.” Respecting
the other alternative, Worthington said be thought they would
willingly concentrate in Florida. 11
Florida, being surrounded on three sides by water, was viewed
as highly vulnerable to foreign attack, especially so with the
Indians in it. Yet late in 1821 the Secretary of War let it be
known that the administration would not try to force the natives
out, that is, would not unless Congress took the initiative by
authorizing such action and appropriating the money for it. 12
Meanwhile, the white personnel for Indian affairs continued
to change. When Governor Jackson left, his duties were divided
between two acting governors, William Worthington for East
Florida and George Walton for West Florida. The Indian super-
intendency, so far as anybody knew, was split between them. The
10. A. Jackson to Secy. of War, Sept.  20, 1821, ibid. ,  211; Secy. of
War to J.  A. Penieres,  Mar. 31, 1821, ibid. ,  27; Secy. of War to
J.  R. Bell ,  Sept.  28,  1821, ibid. ,  220.
11. William Worthington to Secy. of War, Dec. 294.
12. Secy. of War to A. Jackson, Nov. 16, 1821,
4,  1821,  ibid.,
ibid. ,  278.
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next change was the appointment of Peter Pelham, a “riffed” of-
ficer on October 29, 1821, to replace the late Penieres as sub-
agent. Then, on April 17, 1822, a commission was issued to
William Pope DuVal, a judge in East Florida, to succeed Jackson
as the Governor of the Territory of Florida. Three weeks later
Major Gad Humphreys of New York was appointed Indian agent.
He had served thirteen years in the Army before being cast out
by the reduction of 1821, and was badly in need of a regular
sa la ry .  Cap ta in  Be l l  -  who had been cleared of the earlier
charges - had applied for the job given Humphreys, and Secre-
tary of War John C. Calhoun assured him that the latter had not
been chosen because of superior fitness but of greater need. Now
the table of organization was complete once more, and there was
reason to suppose that the Seminoles might expect to learn their
fate promptly. 13
The new governor was to loom very large in the sight of the
Florida Indians, if for no other reason than that he held his post
for twelve years. A descendant of Huguenots expelled from France
by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, he left Virginia, the
place where his forbears had settled, and became a hunter in Ken-
tucky. Then, of a sudden, he grew dissatisfied with what he saw
ahead, abandoned the free ways of the forest and took up the
study of law. Since he had had little education his new way was
hard, but he doggedly stayed with it, and in 1804 was licensed
to practice. It was his fortune sometime in his life to have en-
countered Washington Irving. That author considered him typi-
cal of the best strains in frontiersmen and wrote several stories
centered around his career, using for him the name of “Ralph
Ringwood.” At least in the beginning, DuVal had a wide streak of
sympathy for the Indians. 14
Governor DuVal found the Indians understandably uneasy.
They were wandering in every direction. Because floods had
ruined their crops, some of them were actually starving. They
were digging up miles of the country for “briar” root (coontie)
13. Secy. of War to Peter Pelham, Oct.  29, 1821, ibid. ,  264; William
P. DuVal’s commission, April 17, 1822, ibid., 469; Gad Humphrey’s
commission, ibid. ,  429; see also 429n; Secy. of War to J. R. Bell,
June 1,  1822,  ibid. ,  450; Secy. of War to DuVal,  June 11, 1822,
ibid. ,  453.
14. James O. Knauss, “William Pope DuVal,” Florida Historical Quarter-
l y ,  XI  ( J an .  1933 ) ,  95 -139 .
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which would fend off starvation. They were not willing to make
any improvements on the land lest the white settlers crowding in
confiscate it. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1822 Du-
Val continued to tell this doleful story to the government and to
urge action. Meanwhile, he did what he could on the spot. July
29 he issued a proclamation saying that no white man might deal
with the natives unless he had a special license, and none might
settle near an Indian town. This measure was terribly unpopular
with many of his own people who made money from the Indians,
and could not be enforced. Seeing this, the Governor urged that
his charges be bundled out of the state, either to join the Creeks
or to resettle west of the Mississippi. 15
The Monroe administration was obliged to choose positively
between the alternative courses. At first it favored reuniting the
Seminoles with the Creeks, but this policy met opposition not on-
ly from the Seminoles but from the people of Georgia. Accord-
ingly, it took Jackson’s advice to locate them near the Apalachi-
cola River, this resettlement to be accomplished that very fall. In
July, 1822, Secretary Calhoun said the shift would already have
been completed but for the lack of money. By late August, how-
ever, this relocation lost favor because the administration realized
that it might interfere with the Forbes Purchase which the United
States was honoring pending final settlement of it in court. All
the while the Indians remained on tenterhooks, unable to find out
what lay in store for them. 16
They were humble enough about it. Captain Bell had ex-
plained the why of this when he had been in Florida. “They ap-
pear sensible of their reduced situation; that they are too weak
to make much resistance in war; and that the presumptive rights
to their land has passed into the hands of the American govern-
ment. To that Government, they now look for that liberality,
15. DuVal to Secy. of War, June 21, 1822, Territorial Papers: Florida,
XXII, 471; DuVal to Secy. of War, July 18, 1822, ibid., 491; Proc-
lamation,  July 29,  1822, ibid. ,  504; DuVal to Secy. of War, Sept.
22, 1822, ibid., 533, 534.
16. Secy. of War to DuVal,  July 17, 1822, ibid. ,  488; Secy. of War to
DuVal, Aug. 19, 1822; ibid., 508; Secy. of War to DuVal, Aug. 28,
1822, ibid., 518.
The Forbes Purchase comprised about 1,250,000 acres along the east
bank  of  the  Apalach ico la  River .  The  case  concern ing  i t  was  f ina l ly
settled in favor of the assigns of Forbes in 1835. The brief concerning
the case is printed in Record of the Case of Colin Mitchell and Others
v .  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  (Washing ton ,  1831) .  For  the  s to ry  in  b r ie f  see
William T. Cash, The Story of Florida, 2 vols. (New York, 1938), I, 328.
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justice, and protection, which it has extended to other nations of
Indians.” It is noteworthy that his estimate added up to the same
thing as Acting Governor Worthington’s quoted above; the In-
dians intended to keep the peace if at all possible. Nevertheless
the pressure upon them was very great; hunger, the thronging
white men encroaching on their lands, and the inevitable frictions
between the two cultures, white and red, pushed them into a
corner. There were many border incidents and a murder or
two. 17
The time had come to solve the Seminole problem lest it grow
very ugly. Accordingly, the administration sought to reach de-
cisive action late in 1822. A council with the Indians was set at
St. Marks to be held November 20. This was expected to pro-
duce an agreement, but before it could take place the organization
broke down a second time. To begin with, Peter Pelham, the
subagent, fell ill and had to go north for his life. Then, late in
September, 1822, Governor DuVal abruptly left for Kentucky to
tend to his personal fortunes. Lastly, Agent Humphreys did not
appear in Florida although he was supposed to organize and run
the projected council. There was no one to negotiate for the
government at the council. Acting Governor George Walton was
in a state of panic. His nerves were near the snapping place any-
way, because a terrible epidemic of yellow fever was rampant in
Pensacola, carrying off his friends and loved ones. He had no
knowledge of what the government intended to do at the talks-
DuVal had not posted him - nor had he any money to buy the
presents and food necessary for a pow-wow. Meanwhile, the In-
dians had already been notified, and it was too late to head them
off. Yet if they went to St. Marks and found no representative
of the United States there, relations would be permanently dam-
aged. Walton all but wrung his hands in his letter to Secretary
Calhoun. 18
In the end, that situation occurred which the acting Governor
had shuddered to foresee. A few chiefs went to the rendezvous
on the 20th, and found no preparations to receive them. They
waited three days, then left annoyed. It was not until a week later
17. J. R. Bell to Secy. of War, Aug. 22, 1822, ASP: Indian Affairs, II,
416 ;  DuVal  to  Secy .  o f  War ,  Aug .  3 ,  1822 ,  Terr i t o r ia l  Paper s :
Florida, XXII, 501.
18. A. Eustis to Secy. of War, July 23, 1822, ibid. ,  495; G. Walton to
Secy. of War, Nov. 4,  1822, ibid. ,  501.
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that the “crash” negotiator, Thomas Wright, a paymaster in the
U.S. Army, reached St. Marks. He called the nearby chiefs to-
gether and explained the government’s embarrassment. The In-
dians were good natured about it, for they apparently realized
that they dared not ruffle the new lords of their peninsula. The
head chief in that quarter, Neamathla, assured Wright that his
people would remain quiet until a permanent arrangement was
made for them. 19
What a change was here revealed in Neamathla! In 1817,
only five years before, he had sent word to General E. P. Gaines,
commanding at Ft. Scott, that if American troops so much as
crossed to the Indian side of the Flint River, they would be at-
tacked. Now in 1822, although goaded by uncertainty and sus-
pense, he was meek and tractable while the United States,
through carelessness and poor organization, appeared to trifle with
the future of his people. The steep decline of the Florida Indians
was here vividly demonstrated. 20
At length the white personnel began to reassemble. At long
last Agent Humphreys made his appearance in Pensacola on
Christmas Eve. A month later, Acting Governor Walton issued
him instructions. He had delayed the issue because in DuVal’s
absence he truly did not know what the policy of the government
was. Naturally, his orders were comfortably general. Try to get
the savages to give up the hunt and turn to agriculture, he said,
and “. . . prevent animosity and dissension among themselves,
and suppress apprehension of severity or injustice from our Gov-
ernment, and of violence from the Creek Indians.” General or
not, this was a big order. 21
Governor DuVal returned to Florida in March, 1823, and
bustled about condemning everyone but himself for the confu-
sion which his absence had created. 22
Meanwhile, in Washington the problem of the Florida In-
dians was under discussion. President Monroe referred to it in
his annual message. Thereupon the House of Representatives
established a temporary committee to report on that portion of the
19. Thomas Wright to G. Walton, Dec. 7, 1822, ibid., 578.
20. George Perryman to Lt. Sands, Feb. 24, 1817, ASP: Military Affairs,
I, 681, 682.             
21.  G. Walton’s instructions to Humphreys, Jan. 21, 1823, Territorial
Papers: Florida, XXII, 602.
22. DuVal to Secy. of State, Mar. 16, 1823, ibid., 649.
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message. The head of this committee, Thomas Metcalfe of Ken-
tucky, wrote to Florida for information and then on February 21,
1823, gave his report to the House. His committee, marvelous to
tell, took Article Six of the treaty of transfer with Spain seriously.
The Indians, the report said, must be accorded the privileges of
citizens of the United States. The thing to do, it continued, was
to give each Seminole family a grant of land. This action would
break up the tribal bond and introduce in its stead the energy of
private enterprise. Thus stimulated, they would be prepared to
amalgamate with the white society. Even though this report
showed scant appreciation of the grip upon the Indians of their
own culture, it was surprisingly humane. It was also not much
attended to. 23
Joseph M. Hernandez, in 1823 territorial delegate to Con-
gress from Florida, helped lead the administration toward action.
In reply to his urging, Secretary Calhoun stated the new policy.
Commissioners were to be appointed at once to hold a talk, and be
instructed to insist upon a concentration of the natives south of
“Charlotte’s River.” If there should prove to be insufficient land
for cultivation in that area, the commissioners were to be em-
powered to extend the reservation northward toward Tampa Bay.
The documents do not show why the region along the Apalachi-
cola was given up in favor of a southern reservation. They do,
however, show that the Indians who ranged east of the Suwannee
favored the latter, while those to the west of that river were almost
more willing to migrate to the Far West, beyond the Mississippi,
than to such a place. 24
In any case, Secretary Calhoun meant what he said. On April
7 commissions went out of the War Department to James Gads-
den of South Carolina and to Bernardo Segui of Florida, accom-
23. Metcalfe for Comm. on Indian Affairs to the House of Representa-
tives, Feb. 21, 1823, ASP: Indian Affairs, II, 408-410.
24. J. M. Hernandez to Secy. of War, Mar. 11, 1823, Territorial Papers:
Florida, XXII, 644; DuVal to Secy. of (State, Mar. 16, 1823, ibid.,
649; Secy. of War to J.  M. Hernandez, Mar. 19, 1823, ibid. ,  652;
J. Gadsden to Secy. of War, June 11, 1823, ibid., 695.
Charlotte’s River was a name that showed on several contemporary
maps. Inasmuch as little was known of the south of Florida, its position
did not correspond exactly with any watercourse existing today, but it
probably was what became known later as Pease or Peace Creek. This
stream also bore the designation of Tolochopko or Talakchopko Creek on
some maps. See maps issued by J. S. Tanner in 1823, John Lee Williams
in 1837, and Capt. John Mackey and Lt. J. E. Blake in 1840.
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panied by the instructions described to Hernandez. Little is
known of Segui except that he was a Minorcan who had migrated
to Dr. Turnbull’s colony of New Smyrna. But Gadsden’s name is
more widely recognized because of the purchase he made in 1853
which filled out the boundaries of the continental United States,
except for Alaska. He had been a lieutenant of engineers during
the War of 1812, and an aide to General Jackson thereafter,
holding that post in the invasion of Florida in 1818. By 1820
he had attained the grade of colonel and been appointed adjutant
general, but he resigned in a huff when the Senate refused to
confirm his appointment. The new assignment as commissioner
to treat with the Indians brought about his migration to Florida. 25
On June 30 Governor DuVal was instructed to make himself
a part of the commission. He would have been appointed when
the other two were, said the Secretary, except that it had not been
known then that he had returned from Kentucky. DuVal ac-
cepted on July 15, but much of his energy had to be devoted to
being governor. Of the pair, Gadsden and Segui, the former took
the initiative. It did not seem feasible to meet with the redmen
until their summer agriculture was over, so the date set was Sep-
tember 5. Three months in advance of that day Micanopy and
Jumper, a “Redstick” Creek who had established himself as first
counsellor, committed the tribes over which Micanopy had some
jurisdiction to be present. In an attempt to avoid incidents which
might jeopardize the forthcoming critical negotiations, Governor
DuVal revoked all trading licenses issued to white men before his
administration. 26
Beginning with his summons to the Indians to come to the
talks Gadsden took a hard tone. He gave them to understand
that a treaty was to be concluded, and that “. . . those tribes who
neglect the invitation, or obstinately refuse to attend, will be
considered as embraced within the compact formed, and forced
to comply with its provisions.” This is obviously not the language
of diplomacy but rather of the strong to the weak. That was per-
fectly clear to the Seminoles.
25. “James Gadsden” in Dictionary of American Biography; also Terri-
torial Papers: Florida, XXII, 42n on Gadsden; Commissions to Gads-
den and Bernardo Segui, Apr. 7, 1823, ibid., 659, 660.
26. Agreement marked by Micanopy and Jumper, June 4, 1823, ASP:
Ind ian  A f f a i r s ,  I I ,  432 ;  P roc l ama t ion  June  7 ,  1823 ,  Terr i t o r ia l
Papers: Florida, XXII, 694; also ibid., 659n.
11
Mahon: The Treaty of Moultrie Creek, 1823
Published by STARS, 1961
THE  TREATY  OF  MOULTRIE  CREEK, 1823 361
Gadsden’s personal preference was to remove the natives from
Florida altogether. Inasmuch as this was not included in his in-
structions, he undertook to sell the Secretary of War on the need:
[Florida] must be as internally weak as she is externally
assailable. An Indian population, under these circumstances,
connected with another class of population, which will in-
evitably predominate in Florida, must necessarily add to her
natural weaknesses. . . . It is useless to enlarge on the policy
of removing a class of savages from where they may prove
dangerous to where they would be comparatively harmless.
In this presentation the Commissioner revealed a principal rea-
son why many white men wished to get rid of the Florida Indians.
That other “class of population” to which he referred was not
secure as long as there existed Indian villages to which they could
escape. Too many slaves to suit the masters had already disap-
peared, presumably in that direction. 27
As for Calhoun, he needed no convincing. He agreed that it
was important to move the savages out of the peninsula, but
could do nothing to bring it about. His reason? There were no
lands west of the Mississippi available which the government
could assign to them, and no funds to purchase any. The policy
of systematic Indian removal, although the Secretary could not
know it, still lay seven years in the future. 28
Meanwhile, Andrew Jackson, living the life of a planter at
the Hermitage, learned of the proposed negotiation and offered
Secretary Calhoun his advice. He had already communicated his
ideas to his friend Commissioner Gadsden, he said, and presumed
to address the government unsolicited because he wished very
much to see Gadsden succeed in his first Indian assignment. The
thing to do, Jackson said, was to send half the Fourth U.S. In-
fantry Regiment from Pensacola to the vicinity of Tampa Bay.
This show of force would hasten the concentration of the In-
dians which was to be arranged in the forthcoming talks; indeed
without it they might refuse to comply. 29
James Gadsden had already adopted his old chief’s views. A
month before Jackson’s letter to the Secretary he had urged a
27. J.  Gadsden to Secy. of War, June 11, 1823, ASP: Indian Affairs,
I I ,  4 3 3 ,  4 3 4 .
2 8 .  I b i d .
29 .  A .  Jackson  to  Secy .  o f  War ,  Ju ly  14 ,  1823 ,  Terr i t o r ia l  Paper s :
Florida, XXII, 719, 720.
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show of strength in the following words: “. . . a judicious loca-
tion of an adequate force simultaneous with the concentration of
the Indians cannot but have the happy effect of obtaining such a
controul as to render them perfectly Subservient to the views of
Government.” The use of the phrase “perfectly Subservient,” if
the Commissioner chose his words carefully, once more indicates
that the relationship between the two negotiating parties was
hardly one of balance of power. 30
The movements of troops on the flanks of the proposed reser-
vation was calculated to influence the Seminoles. But this was
not the purpose of the detachment of soldiers to be present on
the treaty grounds. A military detachment was a standard prop
at Indian parleys; in truth the savages would have felt deprived
without the panoply and color which their presence added. Ac-
cordingly, Governor DuVal directed Captain John Erving, com-
mandant of St. Francis Barracks in St. Augustine to send one
officer and twenty-five enlisted men to the site. The Captain be-
gan by protesting that he could spare only half that number, but
in the end produced the full complement under the command of
Lieutenant James Wolfe Ripley. 31
The detachment would not have far to go since the spot se-
lected for the council was the second landing place on the north
bank of Moultrie Creek, about five miles south of St. Augustine.
By contrast, the Indian bands west of the Suwannee River would
have to travel 250 miles to get there. On the other hand, Mican-
opy’s bands had been consulted and had no doubt favored the
site which was very convenient for them. In judging the choice
of the meeting place one must remember that there were no
inland white settlements at the time, no central points to which
the supplies necessary for a council could be transported. 32
During the summer Governor DuVal appointed Horatio S.
Dexter - erstwhile negotiator for the Seminoles - to act as sub-
agent in the place of Peter Pelham, still ill and absent. Dexter,
who knew the Indians of the peninsula quite well, estimated that
1500 of them would attend the talk. They would consume three
30. J.  Gadsden to Secy. of War, June 11, 1823, ibid. ,  696.
31 .  In te rchange ,  DuVal  and  Cap t .  John  Erv ing ,  26 ,  27 ,  Aug . ,  1823 ,
ASP: Indian Affairs, II, 436.
32. St. Augustine East Florida Herald, Sept. 6, 1823, described the treaty
grounds as the second landing place on the north bank of Moultrie
Creek.
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tons of rice. But the other persons responsible for the success of
the negotiation were not as optimistic as he. There was some
anxiety among them that important chiefs might absent them-
selves in spite of Gadsden’s dire warning. To insure the atten-
dance of the trans-Suwannee bands, Agent Gad Humphreys and
interpreter Stephen Richards conducted a party of 350 the whole
14
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250 miles. Their trek was conducted so skillfully that the Mika-
sukies and Tallahassees (the most important bands west of the
Suwannee) did not feel themselves herded; indeed were willing
to see the two white men given an especial reward (to be noted
later). In the end, the pessimists were closer to the truth than
Dexter. Many Indian families were left home to tend the crops,
so that only about 425 redmen, including a few women, attended
the talks. If Dexter’s estimate had been followed concerning pro-
visions, those present must have had to wade through the rice. 33
The Florida Indians - both those who attended and those
who stayed away - did not constitute a cohesive society. About
all they had in common was the Creek culture. There were many
divisive factors tending to offset the common culture. For one,
the bands spoke two major, mutually incomprehensible tongues,
Muskogee and Hitchiti, besides various dialects of these. Second,
the Indians had not come to Florida from the north as a body, but
in individual bands, having no contact with each other, over the
span of a century. The last increments had come to the peninsula
as recently as 1814, and some even later. Some bands of the
late-comers had amalgamated with those already here, others had
not. All in all, with such a background, there could hardly have
been very much cohesion.
The three major groupings were called Mikasuky, Tallahas-
see, and Seminole. The two former resided west of the Suwan-
nee, the latter had scattered pretty well over the upper portion of
the peninsula. Contemporaries usually reserved the name “Semi-
nole” for those peninsular Indians who stemmed from the band
which had migrated into what is now Alachua County in the mid-
dle of the eighteenth century. Cowkeeper had been head chief
at the time of migration. It will be obvious, however, that in this
article, “Seminole” is applied to almost all of the Florida Indians.
For purposes of negotiation the diverse bands who arrived at
Moultrie Creek needed a head chief. Accordingly, a mile and
one-half short of the treaty ground they foregathered to reach an
agreement among themselves. They chose Neamathla, head chief
of the Mikasukies. He had the respect of red and white men
33. DuVal to H. S. Dexter, May 10, 1823, Territorial Papers: Florida,
XXII, 681; St. Augustine East Florida Herald, Sept. 6, 1823; Boyd,
op. ci t . ,  86.
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alike; indeed Governor DuVal called him the most remarkable
savage he had ever seen. 34
Because of the Indians’ organizational meeting the council
itself got under way one day later than agreed. The only ac-
count known to me of the opening day written by a person who
was there, (other than the official minutes) is the diary entry of
the Reverend Joshua Nichols Glenn of St. Augustine. In com-
pany with numerous other townsfolk he took the day off to see
the show at Moultrie Creek. These are his words:
Sat 6th the Treaty with the Floriday Indians commenced to
day in the morning Capt. Wm. Levingston his wife and
Daughter Mr. and Mrs. Streeter and my Self went up to Moul-
try the place of holding the Treaty in a very comfortable Boat
-accompanied by many other gentlemen and Ladies in other
B o a t s  - a little after we landed the Indians came from their
Camps to the Commissioners Camp to Salute the Commis-
sioners & hold their first talks this was quite Novel - the
Indians came in a body with a White Flag flying - beating
a little thing Similar to a Drum and Singing a kind of a Song
at the end of every appearant verse one of them gave a
Shrill hoop - which was succeeded by a loud and universal
Scream from them all - in this way they marched up to the
Commissioners - when two of them in their birthday Suit
and painted all over white with white Sticks in their hands
and feathers tied on them - came up to them (viz the Com-
missioners) and made many marks on them - then their
King Nehlemathlas came forward and Shook hands and after
him all the chiefs in rotation - after which the King Smoked
his pipe and then observed that he considered us gentlemen
as Fathers and Brethren and the Ladies as Mothers and Sis-
ters the Commissioners then conducted the chiefs into the
bark house they had bilt to hold their talk in and after they
had all Smoked together they held their first Talk - in the
evening we returned to Town and the Governor was unwell
he came with us - 35
What was an outing for the curious townsfolk was the be-
ginning of nearly two weeks of exacting negotiations for the prin-
cipals at Moultrie Creek. Seventy chiefs and warriors took part
34. Minutes of the Council, ASP: Indian Affairs, II, 437. For comments
by white men about Neamathla see Gad Humphreys to DuVal, April
7 ,  1 8 2 4 ,  i b i d . ,  6 1 7 ;  D u V a l  t o  S e c y .  o f  W a r ,  J a n .  1 2 ,  1 8 2 4 ,
Territorial  Papers: Florida,  XXII, 823; DuVal to Secy. of War,
Mar. 19, 1824, ibid., 904.
35. “A Diary of Joshua Nichols Glenn: St. Augustine in 1823,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, XXIV (Oct., 1945), 148.
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in the deliberations conducted within the “bark house.” Here, the
show of immediate force played no part. I have seen no docu-
ment indicating that the Indians were required to disarm at the
treaty grounds, but it is probable that they left their weapons at
the Indian camp one and one-half miles farther down the creek.
As for the detachment of twenty-five red legged infantry (mem-
bers of the Fourth Artillery serving on foot), they served pri-
marily as stage decoration, but had in addition a police func-
tion. 36 At least four officers who came along for the spectacle
added the color of their uniforms to the decor, and also added
their signatures to the document finally completed, as witnesses
that it was done in good order.
James Gadsden opened the negotiating. He followed the same
stern line he had employed when summoning the Indians to the
meeting. General Jackson, he reminded them, had subdued them
twice, and might have driven them into the ocean had he chosen.
What the General had done to them was wholly just, inasmuch
as they alone were the cause of the quarrel which had brought
him upon them. Nevertheless, Gadsden continued, the President,
their “Great Father,” was willing to forget the past. But in re-
turn they would have to concentrate; he would not permit them
to remain scattered all over Florida as they then were. “The
hatchet is buried; the muskets, the white men’s arms, are stacked
in peace. Do you wish them to remain so?” The implication was
plain enough, the Seminoles had better agree to the terms offered
or take the consequences. The silken glove here barely concealed
the iron fist. 37
Two days elapsed before Neamathla replied. The records do
not chronicle what took place in the interval. From the fragments
of his talk, which Gadsden reported, it is clear that the chief‘s
tone was surprisingly defiant. For instance, he let the Commis-
sioners know that the Florida Indians regarded the “Redstick”
Creeks in their midst as incorporated with them. They would not
drive them out. This brought a rejoinder from Gadsden the follow-
ing day. Again the mailed fist shone through the thin covering:
“Brave warriors, though they despise death, do not madly contend
36. Minutes of the Council,  ASP: Indian Affairs,  II,  437; signatures on
the treaty, Charles J.  Kappler, Indian Affairs,  Laws and Treaties,
2 vols., Sen. Doc. 452, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., II, 207.
37. Minutes of the Council, ASP: Indian Affairs, II, 437, 438.
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with the strong.” The events of that day, September 10, seem
to have broken the Indian resistance. Neamathla’s next speech
showed the change. His people did not want to go to the reserva-
tion to the south. It was a bad place because the soil was too
poor to sustain them and because it was too close to the big water
across which evil influence could waft to corrupt the young men.
The rest of what he said can best be told in his own words:
We are poor and needy; we do not come here to murmur or
complain; . . . we rely on your justice and humanity; we hope
you will not send us south, to a country where neither the
hickory nut, the acorn, nor the persimmon grows . . . For me,
I am old and poor; too poor to move from my village to the
south. I am attached to the spot improved by my own labor,
and cannot believe that my friends will drive me from it. 38
The allusion to the acorn and the hickory nut are not mere
caprice. Like most savage peoples the Seminoles needed oils, and
they derived them from nuts. Concerning the tenor of the whole
address, its abject humbleness is striking. Was this genuine or
was it deceit? In the light of the additional clause finally ap-
pended to the completed treaty, it is possible that he humbled
himself to impress his own people instead of the white men. On
the other hand, it is possible that the pity he induced in the white
negotiators may have influenced them to modify the instructions
of the authorities in Washington.
The minutes of the talks kept by the Commissioners include
nothing about activities on September 12, 13, and 14. They
cryptically report that on the 15th the outline of a treaty was read
to the Indians. How the provisions in it got there is not known.
Nor is it known how the red negotiators reacted to it, for Sep-
tember 16 and 17 are also slurred over. Indeed there is only one
other entry of consequence except the bald statement that on
September 18 the chiefs signed the treaty. But the event re-
corded for September 19 is of unusual interest. On that day an
additional article was drawn and signed by the interested parties.
It allotted reservations of from two to eight miles square to Nea-
mathla, Blunt, Tuskihadjo, Mulatto King, Emathlochee, and
Econchatomico in the valley of the Apalachicola River. These
chiefs and their followers did not have to move south after all as
they had so much detested to do; indeed they scarcely had to
3 8 .  Ib id . ,  4 3 8 ,  4 3 9 .
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move. The Commissioners frankly told the Secretary of War that
the assent of these six powerful western headmen could not have
been secured without this “equitable provision.” Using balder
terms it would be possible to call this article a bribe. 39 After the
inclusion of the special article, presents were distributed. On
September 21 the Seminoles left the treaty grounds having been
there seventeen days.
What were the provisions of the document to which thirty-
two chiefs had put their X’s? The first paragraph stated that the
Florida Indians appealed to the humanity of the United States,
and threw themselves upon its protection. Next, they surrendered
all claim to the “whole territory of Florida” except for the district
shown on the accompanying map. Their reservation as it was
finally enlarged included about 4,032,940 acres. The Commis-
sioners had exercised the discretion, given them in their instruc-
tions, to move the reservation northward if there was not enough
good land in the preferred area to support the Indians. The latter
had said that they would not go south of Charlotte’s River unless
forced. On these two counts, the entire tract lay north of that
stream instead of south. In addition, it was provided that the
boundaries could be extended to the north if the reservation did
not include enough tillable land. (Two extensions were made in
February and December, 1825.) All in all, if the Seminoles had
title to the “whole territory of Florida” they were ceding roughly
28,253,820 acres of ground. In return for this the United States
obligated itself to:
Protect the Indians as long as they obeyed the law.
Supply them with $6000, worth of agricultural equip-
ment and live stock on the reservation.
Pay $5000 a year for twenty years.
Keep white men out of the reservation except those au-
thorized to be there.
Provide the natives who had to move with meat, corn,
and salt for one year.
Pay up to $4500 for improvements which the Indians
were obligated to abandon.
Provide up to $2000 for transportation to the reservation.
Maintain an agent, subagent, and interpreter in the reser-
vation.
39.  Ibid. ,  439; Kappler,  op. cit. , 207; Commissioners to Secy. of War,
Sept. 26, 1823, ASP: Indian Affairs, II, 440.
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Pay $1000 a year for twenty years to maintain a school
on the reservation.
Pay $1000 a year to maintain a blacksmith and gun-
smith on the reservation.
The cash considerations, and those in kind converted to cash, add
up to $221,000. Expressed in payment per acre this comes to
roughly 3/4 cents; to be exact, 78/100 cents. 40
Three other points in the treaty are worth highlighting. First,
the Indians agreed to try to prevent the concentration of runaway
slaves in their midst. Inasmuch as the presence of fugitive Ne-
groes among them had done much to decide the white men to
force them out, this provision was very important. Second, the
boundaries of the reservation were nowhere closer to the coast
than twenty miles. Thus it was intended to cut the natives off
from intercourse with Cuba, in which they had for generations
received powder, ammunition, and arms, and had - Commis-
sioner Gadsden believed - been able to trade stolen slaves and
cattle. Landwards, too, they were encircled. Being cut off from
outside influence and the chance of expansion, the Commission-
ers believed the savages could be forced to take up agriculture.
This might ultimately soften their barbarism. Finally, the docu-
ment made no mention of duration, that is, it did not guarantee
the reservation to the Seminoles for any specified span of time.
Later, the redmen claimed that the duration was clearly twenty
years inasmuch as the annuities and several of the other payments
ran for that period. 41
Buried in the body of the treaty was a grant of land one mile
square to Gad Humphreys and Stephen Richards each. Like so
much of the rest of the document, it is impossible to say how this
40. Commissioners to Secy. of War, Sept. 26, 1823, Territorial Papers:
Florida, XXII, 747-751; Kappler, op. cit., 203-207. Concerning the
extensions to the reservation see, J. Gadsden to Editor, St. Augustine
News, July 3,  1839; Executive Order,  Feb. 24, 1825, Territorial
Papers: Florida, XXIII, 192, 193; T. L. McKenney to DuVal, Sept.
15, 1825, ibid., 318; Secy. of War to Delegation of Indians, May 10,
1826, ibid., 539.
treaty itself. In computing the cost of rations furnished them I used 1500
Indians fed per day at 121/2 cents per ration, a total of $68,437.55. The num-
ber of Indians and cost per ration was drawn from DuVal to Secy. of War,
July 12, 1824, ibid., 15.
41. J. Gadsden to Secy. of War, June 11, 1823, Territorial Papers: Flor-
ida,  XXII, 696; commissioners to Secy. of War, Sept. 26, 1823,
ibid., 749; Abstract of Council held Oct. 24, 1834, Sen. Doc. 152,
24 Cong., 1 Sess., 25ff.
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provision found its way in. But the Senate of the United States
thought it improper and struck it out before ratifying the balance
of the treaty. 42
Thirty-two Indians signed the Treaty of Moultrie Creek.
Were they representative of a majority of the bands in Florida?
Neamathla submitted, during the talks, a list of thirty-seven Flor-
ida towns and their chiefs. Seventeen of those chiefs can be posi-
tively identified as markers of the Treaty. But what of the other
twenty towns and chiefs? Either they were not represented, re-
fused to sign being present, were considered to be represented by
the mark of some higher chief, or their names on the treaty do
not coincide with those Neamathla gave. The latter is not im-
probable since white scribes put down the Indian names as they
heard them, so that it was very uncommon for the name of a chief
to be recorded the same way by any two or more white men.
Moreover, to offset the twenty missing chiefs we find on the docu-
ment fifteen additional names whose bearers do not appear in
Neamathla’s list of chiefs. The writer does not know whom they
represented. However, this much is certain, here was a more
representative group than the white men ever again gathered into
a Florida council. 43
The Treaty of Moultrie Creek, it is safe to say, was not en-
tirely a white-dictated document. In spite of the inequality of
the power of the two negotiating parties, there was some give on
the part of the stronger. The principal point yielded was to shift
the reservation from the south side of Charlotte’s River to the
north of it. In addition there was the special article which bought
the support of six influential trans-Suwannee chiefs. The Com-
missioners at least implied. that these six would not have knuckled
under without it. So, when one ponders the abject plea of Nea-
mathla, he cannot help wondering what part of it was sincere,
and what proportion window dressing. I confess I do not know,
and do not know how to find out.
Even so, the effect of the inequality of the treating parties
looms large. Each side recognized the imbalance and shaped its
conduct accordingly. Ten days after the signing, James Gadsden,
in a private letter to Secretary Calhoun, said as much. “It is not
42. Territorial Papers: Florida, XXII, 747n.
43. Neamathla’s list is included with the Minutes of the Council, ASP:
Indian Affairs, II, 439.
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necessary,” he wrote, “to disguise the fact to you, that the treaty
effected was in a degree a treaty of imposition - The Indians
would never have voluntarily assented to the terms had they not
believed that we had both the power and disposition to compel
obedience.” Yet the Commissioners felt they had exercised no
more coercion than any powerful party would have done in a
similar situation. 44
Nevertheless, the taint of coercion did not fade away. Two
years after the signing, the newly created Superintendent of In-
dian Affairs wrote a letter to each of the three Commissioners.
Informants told him, he said, that the Indians had been forced
into agreement at Moultrie Creek. Required from each was a re-
port in response to this charge. It is hard to say what the Super-
intendent expected to get in answer, and I have seen but one of
the responses. Governor DuVal reacted with indignation. Who is
my accuser, he demanded? Not until he was confronted by him,
and also accused of specific sorts of duress would he reply. Since
the proceedings were public, he added, anyone could have at-
tended and checked what went on. 45
In summary, the matter of coercion, it seems clear, stemmed
altogether from the discrepancy between the power of the two
parties. James Gadsden did not scruple to remind the savages
over and over of the engulfing power almost certain to be un-
leashed against them if they refused to reach an agreement satis-
factory to the United States. No one was abused or manhandled
on the treaty grounds. Would any government, having the same
margin of power on its side have shown greater forbearance in
the 1830’s? It seems doubtful. The Senate found the treaty
legitimate enough to ratify on December 23, 1823. Thereupon,
since the Indians had no such formality to go through, the pro-
visions were presumed to be in effect. 46
What did the absence of any stipulation about duration sig-
nify? On this, the evidence is contradictory. John C. Calhoun,
certainly one of the most important of the principals, seemed to
regard the arrangement made in the treaty as enduring. Writing
44 .  J .  Gadsden  to  Secy .  o f  War ,  Sep t .  29 ,  1823 ,  Terr i t o r ia l  Paper s :
Florida, XXII, 752.
45. T. L. McKenney to DuVal, Bernardo Segui, and J. Gadsden, Dec. 15,
1825, ASP: Indian Affairs, II, 642; DuVal to McKenney, Jan. 22,
1826, Territorial Papers: Florida, XXIII, 422.
46. Ratification, Territorial Papers: Florida, XXII, 747n.
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to the President on January 24, 1825, he said:
. . . . it is probable that no inconvenience will be felt, for many
years, either by the inhabitants of Florida, or the Indians,
under the present arrangement . . . there ought to be the
strongest and most solemn assurance that the country given
them should be theirs, as a permanent home for themselves
and their posterity. 47
In contrast, James Gadsden wrote to Andrew Jackson in
1829 that the idea behind the treaty had been to get the Indians
concentrated in order eventually to move them west. It is probable
here that he was expressing the view of the Commissioners rather
than that of the government. The three had stated in their report
that it would have been much better to get the Seminoles out of
Florida. As for the other party to the treaty, when pressed
later to leave Florida altogether, the chiefs, claimed that their un-
derstanding about duration was twenty years. 48
Writers have more often than not condemned the Treaty of
Moultrie Creek; indeed Annie Abel, a competent scholar called
it one of the worst Indian treaties ever made by the United
States. 49 It does not seem to me that the march of events, as I
have paraded it here, warrants quite so strong a criticism. But
whatever the moral judgment passed on this treaty, no one can
deny that it was the first in a series of disasters which, in the end,




Secy. of War to President, Jan. 24, 1825, ASP: Indian. Affairs, II,
5 4 3 ,  5 4 4 .   
Commissioners to Secy. of War, Sept. 26, 1823, Territorial Papers:
Florida, XXII, 750; J. Gadsden to A. Jackson, Nov. 14, 1829, Jack-
son Papers, Library of Congress.
Annie Heloise Abel, “The History of Events Resulting in Indian
Consolidation West of the Mississippi,” American Historical Asso-
ciation, Annual Report, 1906, I, 330, 332.
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